Between Hopes and Disillusionment: Constitutional Reforms and Decentralisation in Kenya, 2000–2020 by Josse-Durand, Chloé
 
Marie-Aude Fouéré, Marie-Emmanuelle Pommerolle and Christian Thibon
(dir.)
Kenya in Motion 2000-2020
Africae
Chapter 4
Between Hopes and Disillusionment: Constitutional
Reforms and Decentralisation in Kenya, 2000–2020
Chloé Josse-Durand
Matteo Réveillon and Sarah Levy Klimpke
DOI: 10.4000/books.africae.2480
Publisher: Africae
Place of publication: Paris & Nairobi
Year of publication: 2021





JOSSE-DURAND, Chloé. Between Hopes and Disillusionment: Constitutional Reforms and Decentralisation
in Kenya, 2000–2020 In: Kenya in Motion 2000-2020 [online]. Paris & Nairobi: Africae, 2021 (generated 23




Between Hopes and Disillusionment
Constitutional Reforms  
and Decentralisation in Kenya, 2000–2020
Chloé Josse-Durand
Translated by Matteo Réveillon & Sarah Levy Klimpke
In 2010, Kenya made a bold decision: it reformed its constitution by launching 
a decentralisation—also called devolution—which the World Bank referred 
to as “ambitious” and “unprecedented” in Africa (World Bank 2012, xi). The 
exceptional nature of this decentralisation lied not only in its large-scale 
territorial reform but also in the large number of functions delegated to 
new local levels of governance, called counties. Each of the new 47 counties 
was granted a large share of civil servants and financial and administrative 
means to elaborate its own local public policies and to pass laws in its 
parliamentary assemblies. This institutional change rekindled academic 
thinking on decentralised governance in Africa, inspiring new research 
aimed at comparing, discussing and studying this innovative governance 
mechanism.1 Recent academic studies have underlined the significant 
progress that might be made in the distribution of basic services, the 
reduction of economic inequalities between regions, and the appeasement 
of land disputes and identity claims in Kenya.2 They have, however, also 
emphasised the limits of this reform. Among other things, they have 
highlighted shortcomings in the reform’s formalisation and implementation, 
including the conservation of a national level pre-eminence, an increase in 
political competition and violence, the proliferation of cronyism, and the 
growth of inequalities in the counties (as opposed to in the regions).3 This 
chapter, noting the continued relevance of the debates on the impact of 
1. In the early 2005–2010, many publications analysed this original form of 
governance: Ghai (2008), Branch & Cheeseman (2008), Cheeseman & Tendi 
(2010), Githinji & Homlquist (2008), Kanyinga & Long (2012). More recently, see 
Burbidge (2019).
2. For some—far less numerous—optimistic prospects: Shilaho (2015), Steeves 
(2015), Elszasz (2016), Crawford & Hartmann (2008), World Bank (2011; 2012; 
2015), Bouka, Berry & Kamuru (2019), Elfversson & Sjögren (2019).
3. For some more critical perspectives: Mudida (2009), Hassan (2013), Adbille 
& Abdi (2016), Cannon & Ali (2018), Chome (2015), D’Arcy & Cornell (2014; 
2016), Githinji & Holmquist (2012), Berman, Cottrell & Ghai (2009), Boone et al. 
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constitutional reforms and the consequences of decentralisation on Kenyan 
society and political system in Kenya and in the academic realm, aims to 
contribute to these debates.4
Debates over this reform relate to Kenya’s long-term political history. 
Decentralisation is a political process through which—as a result their 
acquisition of a share of national income and the ability to raise their own 
funds—territorial authorities gain greater autonomy in decision making 
and action, as well as more financial resources. This concept has been 
at the heart of Kenyan political debates since the 1950s (Burbidge 2019). 
Until independence in 1963, these debates revolved around the issue of 
Majimboism,5 that is, the granting of power to regions. Between the 1960s 
and the 1980s, under the presidency of Jomo Kenyatta (1963–1978) and the 
first mandate of Daniel arap Moi (1978–2002), Majimboism vanished from 
political debates despite the fact that Daniel arap Moi had been a strong 
advocate of the Majimbo ideology during the fight for independence (Maxon 
2016, 20). This disappearance was the result of both a secessionist threat 
(especially in the North of the country6) and the authoritarian regime 
maintained by Kenya’s first two presidents (Nyong’o 1989). From 1982 
onwards, Daniel arap Moi implemented pro-rural development measures, 
it seemed, under the pretence of deconcentrating, but not for the purpose 
of real decentralisation (Southall & Wood 1996, 508–9). In the early 1990s, 
the political opposition, together with students and civil society, called for 
(2019), Burbidge (2015), Cheeseman, Lynch & Willis (2016), and more recently 
Cheeseman, Lynch & Kanyinga (2020).
4. This chapter benefited from the sound suggestions of Marie-Emmanuelle 
Pommerolle, Claire Médard and Marie-Aude Fouéré, who I warmly thank, along 
with Paul Kembala (alias Maddo) for sharing his nuanced approach of Kenyan 
politics with me.
5. The Swahili word majimbo means “region.” Directly after independence, 
these regions took the form of 8 administrative provinces, which were replaced 
by 47 counties from the 4th  March 2013 elections and the implementation of 
decentralisation.
6. Just before Kenya’s independence, the 1960 independence of Somalia 
contributed to push the Majimbo ideology into the background during the 1960s. 
The Somali political elites, as well as the Kenyan political elites originally from 
Somalia, claimed that Kenya’s Northern Frontier District belonged to the new 
Somali State. Two weeks before independence, President Jomo Kenyatta declared 
the state of emergency and deployed the army in North-East Kenya. This region 
immediately became one of the 8 Kenyan provinces (North-Eastern Province), 
which triggered a secessionist conflict at the regional level (Ethiopia, Djibouti, 
Somalia, Kenya). This conflict is known as the Shifta war (meaning “bandits” 
in Amharic) in 1963–1967. On the reformulation of these secessionist debates 
within the frame of decentralisation, see Brancati (2006).
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the return of multipartyism in Kenya and a radical change of its political 
system. They faced strong state repression (Pommerolle 2005, Ruteere 2010).
The notion of decentralisation resurfaced with the writing of a new 
constitution during Mwai Kibaki’s 2002 presidential campaign. The 8 
majimbo created after independence were divided in 47 counties. The 
borders of these counties correspond to the borders of some former districts 
which had been subdivided in the 1990s (Barkan & Chege 1989) before being 
“reassembled” to form counties led by locally-elected governments. The 
local administration remains however highly centralised and monitored 
by County Commissioners. This system is somewhat reminiscent of the 
former provincial government (Bourmaud 1988, 217). The conjunction of 
a local government appointed by the central governing power (national 
level) with the election of a local government (which appoints a local 
administrative staff) highlights the combination of two distinct power 
structures. Note that while these power structures intertwine, they also 
compete with one another (Médard 2006). Nonetheless, elected local 
officials—including governors, senators, women’s representatives, member 
of parliaments or members of local assemblies—enjoy flexibility in terms 
of governance. They play a leading role in public decision-making and, 
thanks to local parliaments (the County Assemblies) and the new budgets 
at their disposal, are capable of developing local projects. The political 
class is showing growth and, because of the governors’ political weight 
and as their governments enjoy a local base, a reconfiguration of power is 
emerging (Cheeseman, Lynch & Willis 2016).
For Kenyan citizens and activists, the constitutional reforms and 
the political openness of the early 2000s fostered some hope for the 
democratisation of Kenya’s political and media spheres.7 In theory, such 
developments would ensure the improvement of governance (notably 
through public participation), transparency in the use of public funds, and 
a better redistribution of national financial resources. Hence, these reforms 
appear to be the long-awaited answers to both the territorialised and 
ethnicised resource-related tensions (including land) and the reduction of 
the historical inequalities and injustices that fuel these tensions.8 Because 
they would guarantee greater transparency and strengthen the control of 
public finances at the national level, the reforms could also reconciliate 
citizens with their elected officials. Be that as it may, this new wave of hope 
7. The hopes of the Kenyan activist sphere—soon to be shattered—were 
transcribed in an article by Robert Press (2012) that gave voice to some activists.
8. On the question of “historical injustices” in Kenya and the entrenchment 
of the land issue in Kenyan power relations since the implementation of the 
constitutional reforms and decentralisation, see Francesca Di Matteo in this 
volume and D’Arcy & Nitstotskaya (2019).
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must be put into perspective.9 While decentralisation structures political 
practices and representations, it does not transform them completely. 
Quite the opposite: it reinforces some dynamics that should be brought to 
light through a macro and a micro analysis of the reforms that have been 
implemented since the 2013 general elections.
Debates over the structure of the Kenyan state (unitary, decentralised, 
federalist) keep causing much violence. This violence is less the consequence 
of ethnic contention than of past or broken pacts between political 
elites at every level of authority and of the administration (Oucho 1998; 
Atieno Odhiambo 2004; Klopp 2002). Driven by a deep-rooted capitalist 
accumulation logic, these elites tend to defend their own economic and 
political interests through an ethnic rhetoric. This type of rhetoric succeeds 
in mobilising voters, but overlooks social, political and economic inequalities 
(Lonsdale 2004; Berman & Lonsdale 1992, II). Changing the rules of this 
neo-patrimonial, paternalist and clientelist game—which underpin the 
interpersonal relationship between elites themselves, and between elites 
and citizens—is neither in the interest of elected local officials, nor in that 
of territorial administrators10 (Bach & Gazibo 2012; Githinji & Holmquist 
2012; Hornsby 2013, 260–1). The governance system established through 
decentralisation also ensures the subsistence of political and economic 
agreements concluded between local and national elites; and, what is 
more, it guarantees the protection of their respective interests (D’Arcy & 
Cornell 2014; Gadjanova 2019; Waddilove 2019). Ultimately, the effective 
implementation of decentralisation is restrained mostly by vicissitudes 
inherited from the past and the permanency of the central state’s weight 
(Hassan 2013). Corruption, for its part, has been decentralised, or at least 
enhanced, at every level (Burbidge 2015a; D’Arcy & Cornell 2016). And 
even if local assemblies and elected representatives (called Members of 
County Assemblies or MCAs) counterweigh the local executive, public 
participation of citizens in defining the priorities of development is not 
convincing (World Bank 2015; Rwigi, forthcoming).
This chapter aims to illustrate the changes initiated by these administrative 
and political reforms since the early 2000s. Its purpose is also to display the 
perceptible continuities of the political practices of Kenyan politicians. The 
first section offers an introductory political chronology of the elections, 
9. Many academic publications aimed to nuance these flourishing hopes during 
that decade, for instance: Kagwanja (2003), Murunga & Nasong’o (2006), Otieno 
(2005), Githinji & Holmquist (2012), Berman, Cottrell & Ghai (2009), Branch & 
Cheeseman (2010), Kanyinga & Long (2012).
10. On the persistence of neo-patrimonial practices in Kenyan public 
administration, see Cohen (1993) for the provincial administration, and Onyango 
(2017) for the counties’ administration.
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partisan debates, and proposed reforms about Kenya’s historic inequalities 
and political moralisation since the early 2000s. This part aims to explain 
how decentralisation has been implemented as a means to resolve the 
issues inherited from Kenya’s political history—taking into consideration 
the fact that Kenya was built upon a strong legacy of administrative 
centralisation on the one hand, and major political crises on the other 
hand. The second section offers thoughts on the decentralisation project 
itself and its implementation. In particular, it questions the emphasis on 
local democracy and the approach of “local elected representatives.” The 
final section sheds light on the government’s development-centric vision, 
explains the cooperation arrangements between counties, and, on the basis 
of concrete examples, explores how these levels of authority interact.
1. Decentralisation Grappled with the Turbulence  
of Kenya’s Political Life
Decentralisation is at the heart of Kenya’s contemporary public and political 
debate. It is a long-standing political project whose identity and territorial 
dimensions have always been questioned by both Kenyan elites and 
citizens. In the 1960s and the 1970s, “decentralisation” denoted Majimboism 
(regionalism). The Swahili Majimbo and Majimboism refer to the distribution 
of power to the regions. A controversial political project, regionalism was 
championed by Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, former Prime Minister of Jomo 
Kenyatta having joined the opposition. Like Jomo Kenyatta’s plan of unitary 
government, Odinga’s political project proposed a territorial and ethnic 
definition of access to resources based on administrative regions (Médard 
1999). Indeed, at the time of independence, the Kenya African National 
Union (KANU), the political party led by Kenyatta, played a key role in 
the struggle against British colonial rule. KANU promoted national unity 
and the advent of a centralised state based on “Kikuyu constitutionalism,” 
which was inspired by the monarchical and imperial system established by 
British authorities (Kenyatta 1938, Lonsdale 2006). Representatives of ethnic 
minority groups, like Ronald Ngala (mijikenda), Masinde Muliro (luhya) or 
Daniel arap Moi (kalenjin), were opposed to this idea. With the support of 
the British, they proposed establishing a multi-racial governance system 
based on a “Majimbo Constitution.” This would guarantee the interest of 
minorities as well as the establishment of a regional power base.11 The 
representatives of these ethnic minority groups first formed their own 
regional parties, which united behind the Kenya African Democratic Union 
11. These minority groups were supported by the British (including the settlers) 




(KADU). In the 1960s, KADU received the support of the Rift Valley, the 
coastal region and the Western part of the country. The populations of 
these areas with little government presence favoured a federal state and the 
decentralisation of the public authority to the regions. The 1961 elections 
settled the matter: KANU won with 67,4% of the votes against 16,4% for 
KADU. As the KANU leaders called on those of the KADU to rally behind 
efforts to create a government of national unity, the “Majimbo Constitution” 
project came to an end and Kenya became a de facto one-party state.12
To put an end to the violence associated with the Majimbo claims in 
the 1960s and 1990s, the 2010 Constitution introduced and provided for 
the use of the more neutral Swahili terms ugatuzi13 (decentralisation) and 
usambazaji wa madaraka (responsibility sharing). These terms, which have 
their origins in the constitutional debates of the 1960s, were used in the 
official reports that followed the 2007 post-elections violence. Note that 
this change in terminology was less about promoting regional preference 
than about reforming the provincial government’s system, which had 
resulted from colonisation and was considered inadequate.14 The districts 
were indeed perceived as fostering political ethnicity as they stimulated 
politicised ethnic disputes and entrenched local identities (Hassan 2016). 
Since their establishment at independence, these districts had been 
subjected to much political manipulation. For instance, between the 1992 
and 2002 elections, Daniel arap Moi created 30 new districts in an effort to 
sway votes, as did Mwai Kibaki between 2002 and 2013.15 Indeed, although 
Moi had been a strong supporter of the Majimbo system, once he was in 
power (1978–2002), his promises of reform gave way to a process of power 
deconcentration aimed at strengthening his base in the regions through 
the strategic appointment of Provincial and District Commissioners, 
representing the central administration, and the establishment of police 
stations in the different provinces of the country.
12. In 1964, less than a year after independence, the opposition was dissolved 
and a decree—adopted by a 2/3 majority in the House of Representatives—buried 
the Majimbo Constitution by amending its prerogatives.
13. On this topic, see the definition of the Swahili Oxford Living Dictionaries (2018) 
at the ugatuzi entry.
14. It should be made clear that the local political level has been built as a 
political arena since colonisation. The politicisation of the districts rests on 
a double dynamic: 1) the creation of new districts to fight the 1990s requests 
for multipartyism (Hassan 2016), but also 2) the non-reform of the provincial 
administration which made it possible for the central power to control the local 
level (Médard 2006).
15. Mathenge, Oliver. 2009. “All Constituencies now Turned into Districts.” The 
Nation, 13 July [archive].
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As this debate involves a long chronology of events, we should be aware of 
the political episodes that preceded and shaped the decentralisation project 
as it exists today, as well as its use in the political debates of the 2000–2020 
period. In the 1990s, the KANU’s strategy was mainly aimed at reviving 
the Majimbo ideology to win the elections in the Rift Valley and the coastal 
region. It put forward the ethnic argument, that is, indigenous claims, to pit 
the “natives” (or “self-convinced ‘locals’” or “new indigenes” as Gabrielle 
Lynch calls them, 2011) against the more recent “migrants” (Jenkins 2012), 
without taking any concrete steps towards decentralisation. Following the 
violent and biased 1992 and 1997 elections, the December 2002 elections 
marked a historical transition in Kenyan political history with the end of 
the KANU monopoly of power (which had been de facto in 1969, and de 
jure in 1982 and 1991) and the victory of a multi-party coalition (Throup & 
Hornsby 1998, Maupeu 2003). These presidential and legislative elections 
took place in a peaceful context despite fears and the first terrorist attacks 
in the area.16 The victory of the NaRC (National Rainbow Coalition) led 
by Mwai Kibaki against Uhuru Kenyatta—who, in this first candidacy, had 
been designated as Moi’s successor—was unexpected. It raised high hopes 
for the establishment of a social contract that the increasingly authoritarian 
practices of the previous regimes had torn apart (Grignon & Maupeu 1998).
But these hopes were quickly dashed by the inertia of the first Kibaki 
government, which did not seem inclined to keep its promises to liberalise 
the political system. The work of the government agencies created to 
oversee the constitutional reform and transform a basic law inherited from 
the colonial period failed to convince the Kenyans. This was especially true 
in the case of the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) 
whose function was to ensure the healing of ethno-political conflicts 
by promoting greater inclusiveness; and that of the Truth, Justice and 
Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) aimed at redressing the injustices of the 
past (Bosire & Lynch, 2014). In 2003, the NaRc introduced the Constituency 
Development Fund (CDF). The CDF was intended to encourage the transfer 
of funds from the national level to the local level: as a result of the CDF 
2.5% of the national income was allocated to Members of Parliament 
(MPs) for the development of their constituencies. The CDF was not so 
innovative in that it was an institutionalised version of harambee (literally 
“all together”). Collective fundraisings encouraged local leaders to initiate 
local development projects with the population (creation of health centres, 
schools, etc.), the operating costs of which would then be covered by 
the government. The existence of this decentralised fund—albeit highly 
16. The attacks on the American embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 
August 1998 left a deep impression because of their violence and death toll, in 
the same as the attack on a Mombasa hotel in November 2002.
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corrupt (Cheeseman 2008)—led some to describe Kenya as a country with 
a “high degree of decentralisation” (Ndegwa 2002) even before the 2010 
Constitution had been passed. However, these measures satisfied neither 
the Kenyan Human Rights Commission (KHRC), nor the activists and 
associations, which mobilised and demanded action from the government. 
This move shed light on the fragility of the change in power.17 Clear 
objections were also perceived among the victorious (and profoundly 
heterogeneous) coalition (Otieno 2005), and within which the Kikuyu elite 
was itself divided (Branch 2010, 304).
Frustrations materialised in the creation of the “orange movement,” a 
multi-party alliance of MPs rallied around the person of Raila Odinga, the 
son of Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, who opposed Kibaki’s draft constitution. 
In November 2005, the rejection of the draft by referendum completed the 
break-up of the NaRc and set apart the political factions that would be 
part of the opposition during the December 2007 elections. As the leader 
his new party—the Orange Democratic Movement, ODM—, Raila Odinga 
pledged to carry out an ambitious program during the first 90 days of 
his presidency: to implement a constitutional reform (as announced in 
2002) and decentralisation. He condemned the corruption of the Kibaki 
government, which had failed to put an end to thievery inherited from the 
Moi era. His program focused on setting up a more equitable redistribution 
of resources, strengthening the counties’ capacities (60% of public funds 
would go to regional and local governments), limiting the executive branch 
and establishing a parliamentary system. For its part, Kibaki’s program was 
not surprising and represented a straight continuation of the promises he 
had made during his first term, namely: free secondary education, improved 
public services, and job creation.
In the aftermath of the 27 December 2007 presidential election, in which 
more than 14 million Kenyans came to the polls, sometimes waiting more 
than six hours to enter a polling station.18 The results of the elections 
were clear: Mwai Kibaki had been re-elected with 4,584,721 votes, while 
his opponent Raila Odinga had obtained 4,352,993 votes—a difference of 
only about 230,000 votes. Even before the official results were announced, 
the Raila Odinga camp actively denounced a massive fraud ordered by 
the incumbent government. The Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK), a 
17. While alternation was a source of optimism in Kenya and elsewhere, it was 
quickly put into question. See in particular the critical introduction by Godwin 
Murunga and Shadrack Nasong’o (2006). 
18. Turnout reached an all-time high of 69%, or 9,886,650  voters. The 2013 
election (the first general election under decentralisation) beat this record with 
a rate of 85,01% and 14,352,533 registered voters (a rate never seen before).
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supposedly independent but often denounced body,19 was seized upon the 
discovery of an illegal voters’ list in Raila Odinga’s precinct a few days 
before the elections, and because of internal irregularities in the system 
put in place: multiple registrations of the same voter or of deceased voters, 
circulation of false ballot papers, and suspicious movements of buses or 
coaches—escorted by the police or the Kikuyu militia Mungiki—which 
were suspected to transport full ballot boxes towards the regions which 
were won over to the opposition.20
On the evening of Sunday, 30 December, ECK’s president Samuel Kivuitu 
proclaimed the final results: Mwai Kibaki had won the presidential election. 
Yet, the results previously announced during the counting of votes—which 
did not take the representativeness of the local results for the whole 
country into account—showed that Raila Odinga led by a considerable 
amount.21 Once again, political violence was used to weaken both electoral 
competition and democracy (Connan & Brisset-Foucault 2008). While there 
was a suspicion of widespread fraud at all the levels of the presidential 
election (a suspicion on which the ECK did not comment), the parliamentary 
elections resulted in a clear victory of the ODM candidates. These events 
triggered demonstrations and the first acts of violence in two informal 
settlements of Nairobi that Raila Odinga had won over: Kibera, which was 
his stronghold in the Langat’a constituency, and Kawangware. In the four 
months following the election, from December 2007 to April 2008, nearly 
1,100 Kenyans lost their lives and about 600,000 people fled the violence, 
becoming internal refugees (Internally Displaced People, IDP, ICG 2008).22 
Fuelled by deep historical inequalities and territorial tensions over access to 
land (Médard 2008), the discords affecting Nairobi’s poor neighbourhoods, 
medium-sized cities (Kisumu, Mombasa, Eldoret) and cosmopolitan regions 
of Kenya were reduced in unjust ways to the effects of ethnic antagonisms 
by political elites and the international media. Above all, these discords 
19. Both for its proximity to the authorities and also for the intimidation of its 
representatives. 
20. The Mungiki political militia is a prophetic religious movement, particularly 
influential in the Kikuyu diaspora of the Rift Valley and in the cities of the 
Central Province. It has been mobilised in times of political crises by Kikuyu 
elites since the late 1980s (Kagwanja 2003; Maupeu 2013).
21. The day after the vote, on the evening of December 28th, 50% of the votes 
of the presidential poll were counted at the Kenyatta International Conference 
Centre by the ECK: 3.3 million votes for Odinga and 2.4 million for Kibaki. The 
next day, on December 29, the gap gradually narrowed to around 30,000 votes. 
And the day after, Kibaki was declared winner of the presidential election, with 
250,000 more votes (4,584 million votes for Kibaki, 4,352 million for Odinga).
22. See the issue of Afrique contemporaine on this theme, especially the article 
by Christian Thibon (2013).
Chloé Josse-Durand
138
were territorialised class conflicts inscribed in the trajectory of a capitalist 
state that had developed globalised neoliberal policies and whose neo-
patrimonial mechanisms structured the economy, politics and the society 
(see Calas as well as Maupeu in this volume). International mediations were 
carried out under the aegis of UN Secretary General Kofi Annan; and led to 
a coalition and a power-sharing agreement in April 2008. In an attempt to 
guarantee peace, a government of national alliance (Grand Coalition) was 
established. Mwai Kibaki held the position of President and worked closely 
with his former opponent and Prime Minister Raila Odinga to develop a set 
of policies aimed at reuniting the country politically and socially. Protecting 
the economy from the vicissitudes of politics was a priority.
Thus, Kibaki’s second term was guided by a strong consensus on 
national development to defuse the main socio-economic gaps which had 
led to the 2007 crisis. This new direction led to the promotion of Kenya’s 
Vision 2030 development plan: a set of reforms and major infrastructure 
projects expected to bring Kenya to the status of a middle-income country 
within the next 20 years. The current “Building Bridges Initiative” (BBI) is 
one of these projects.23 The new direction was also reflected in a complex 
consensus around the redefinition of the constitution which, beyond a 
global reform of the Kenyan system, intended to pacify the elections in 
Kenya.24 From 2008 onwards, the coalition government led to a process of 
co-writing of the 2010 Constitution (known as the Bomas Draft) by Mwai 
Kibaki’s and Raila Odinga’s political entourage and some elected officials 
close to them. The latest version of the draft promoted decentralisation 
(Kasfir 2005). In an effort to restore credit to his government, Kibaki used 
decentralisation as a facade while his camp’s recommendations conferred 
a significant economic and political power to the governors. The MPs 
contributed to the draft Constitution by committing to decentralise power 
at the level of 47 counties (and not at that of the 8 existing provinces). This 
decision, however, went against the principle that minority groups and 
some opposition parties had been defending for almost 70 years.25 Indeed, 
the chosen political units (from the ward to the county) were generally 
thought to be too small to constitute a real counter-power capable of 
threatening the central government (see later in this section).
Following a second referendum which received a 67% “yes” vote, the 
adoption of the new Constitution in the summer of 2010 promised a better 
balance of power and mediation of land conflicts. The new text retained the 
23. The BBI Initiative is an extension of the Vision 2030 project (see conclusion).
24. Indeed, the violence and their recollection profoundly influenced the 
campaign and the management of the election announced for March 4, 2013.
25. See the article by Justin Willis and Ngala Chome (2014), which details these 
expectations from the perspective of the Coastal region and elites.
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presidential system, but subjected presidential appointments (ministers, 
prosecutors, ambassadors) to approval by the Parliament—which could 
now dismiss the President. Two new bodies were also set up: the Senate, 
composed of 47 members elected from the new administrative districts (the 
counties);26 and the Supreme Court, responsible for arbitrating disputes 
concerning the presidential election, as well as challenges to judgements 
handed down on appeal. “Traditional” civil liberties (of expression, worship, 
association, etc.) are guaranteed,27 and dual nationality is now possible. 
The land reform component was more controversial. It provided for the 
establishment of a National Land Commission (NLC). It also included the 
legal review of “historical injustices”—including “land grabbing issues”—
and the limitation of private ownership, in particular the duration of 
emphyteutic leases for foreigners. This measure challenges the illegal 
acquisition of land involving the highest levels of the state and its elites 
since independence (Boone et al. 2019). Both the National Land Policy (2009) 
and the 2010 Constitution adopted principles—which are not always put in 
practice, especially with regards to so-called “community lands”—intended 
to emancipate land institutions from the centralised bureaucratic system of 
land administration inherited from the colonial era.28 These debates show 
that decentralisation raises a crucial question: which level of power—local 
or national—is entitled to control land and legislate on land ownership 
as well as on past and present disputes? This question relates to the very 
principles of the new decentralised political system aimed at establishing 
local and participatory control over resources.
2. The Principles  
of the New Decentralised Political System
Consider the following sentence: “Politics in tune with community 
(…), building from the ground-up a participatory system of governance 
that stays in touch with communities by staying in communities” 
(Burbidge 2019, 12). It sums up the principles at the heart of the Kenyan 
decentralisation experience in a nutshell. It describes a participatory and 
inclusive system of governance anchored in public opinion and decision-
making at the local level.
26. Also sitting in the Senate are 16 representatives designated by the political 
parties on the basis of their representativeness, two youth representatives and 
two representatives of persons with disabilities.
27. It should however be pointed out that while the new Constitution raised 
many hopes for freedoms (especially with the creation of various commissions), 
the political context hardened under Uhuru Kenyatta’s presidency, between 2013 
and 2017, and particularly regarding media freedoms.
28. See Di Matteo in this volume.
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The 47 counties created by the Constitution have equivalent legal and 
political status. Each county government has an executive branch headed 
by the Governor, his cabinet of ministers (the County Executive Committee) 
and all the County Chief Officers, namely, sub-county-, wards- and village- 
administrators. The county government’s legislative branch consists of 
the County Assembly and the county’s representation at the national 
level (through the election of one MP per constituency and one Senator 
per county). The County Public Service Board recommends candidates for 
appointment as Ministers by the Governor, and manages human resources 
at the county level. The diagram below shows the relationship between the 
executive and legislative branches of government at the level of Kenyan 
county structures, and their equivalent in the national structure of power 
(Republic of Kenya 2014).
The Governor leads his county government, just as the President leads 
the national government.29 In the national government, the President 
appoints the Cabinet Secretaries. The Public Service Commission 
recommends the candidates for appointment as Principal Secretaries to the 
President. The civil servants of each department answer to their Principal 
Secretary. In the counties, the Governor appoints the County Executive 
Committee members (CEC or CECs). They head the local ministries, which 
perform the functions partially-decentralised by the central government, 
namely: agriculture, health services, cultural activities, trade and finance. 
Ministers participate in the preparation of the so-called County Planning 
Development Plans (five-years development plans). CECs (equivalents of 
ministers) and County Chief Officers (equivalents of Principal Secretaries) 
are recommended for appointment to the Governor by the County Public 
Service Board. The latter manages civil servants at the county level, just 
as the Public Service Commission does at the national level. These are two 
separate commissions in the context of which the national level cannot 
influence the local level (the national civil service, i.e. the state civil service, 
is not in a position to re-centralise its responsibilities).
To carry out the functions of the national government at the local level, 
a decentralised administration accountable to the central government 
has been maintained alongside the counties’ administration. This local 
administration is connected to the national level and consists of Local 
Civil Service Administrations governed by Regional Coordinators (i.e. 
29. While the president must be Kenyan, a governor is not required to be from 
the county he represents. Yet, in practice, and because of political ethnicity, all 
governors come from the counties that elected them. See the detailed results in 
the appendices provided by Dominic Burbidge (2019): 2013 Gubernatorial Election 
Results (Appendix C: 239–48) and 2017 Gubernatorial Election Results (Appendix 
D: 249–51), as well as governors’ biographies (Appendix E and F).
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County Commissioners), Deputy County Commissioners (at the head of 
sub-counties) and chiefs (at the head of wards), all of whom answer to the 
Ministry of the Interior. They have no say in the direction of local affairs and 
their missions are limited to the functions that have not been decentralised. 
The County Commissioners’ authority places them in a role similar to 
those who, in the former provincial administration, were called Provincial 
and District Commissioners. The counties therefore have a decentralised 
administrative machinery to carry out their functions. This machinery has 
been developed at the sub-county, ward (an elected MCA) and village levels 
Fig. 1: Executive and legislative functions at the national and county levels
Adapted from two graphs from Burbidge (2019):  
Fig. 1.1: The Executive branch of county and national governments (p. 14);  
and Fig. 1.2: The Legislative branch of county and national governments (p. 16).
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(with Village Administrators gathered in a village council, which is made 
up of a handful of “elders”). The elders are not necessarily elderly men, but 
they occupy a central role in the local community they represent. For each 
ward, the elected MCA must work closely with the chief appointed by the 
central government. Counties cannot negotiate constitutional changes and 
do not have their own sovereignty (unlike in the federalist systems, for 
instance).
Now turning to the legislative branch. The Parliament consists of two 
chambers, the National Assembly and the Senate. The National Assembly 
is composed of 290 MPs who are elected in their constituencies. To promote 
gender parity, each county elects a woman (the Women Representative) who 
sits in Parliament with the MPs. Note that she represents her county rather 
than a particular constituency. The mission of the County Assemblies is very 
similar to that of the National Assembly’s. They pass budgets and laws, and 
are both responsible for deciding on the impeachment of their respective 
executives. Naturally, the County Assemblies discuss and vote only on 
county budget and expenditures (county bills). The Senate is composed 
of 47 senators from the 47 counties. Their role is to pass laws that, while 
having a national impact, concern the counties in particular. If the MCAs 
request it, the Senate is also responsible for deciding on the impeachment 
of governors with a final vote, following [its own] investigation.
National laws regulate the distribution of national income between 
the central and county governments—as laid down in the Constitution. 
The National Assembly decides on the division of revenues between the 
national and county governments. It then determines how the national 
revenue is divided and allocated to the counties. The counties can also 
raise their own taxes. Note that their available sources of revenue fall into 
five main categories: [1] local revenues (taxes on services, property, etc.), 
conditional and unconditional grants (allocated to the counties by the 
national government for specific funding, such as “Level 5 hospitals,” public 
hospitals previously managed by the provincial administration and that 
have become county referral hospitals), [2] equalisation funds (allocated 
to the most disadvantaged counties), [3] national equitable share (share 
given by the national government, corresponding to 15% of the national 
revenue),[4] private donors (e.g. the French Development Agency, which 
supported the Kisumu County Urban Renewal Plan), [5] and loans (repaid 
by the counties, with interests, and only with the agreement of the national 
government, which will pay the counties’ debts if they cannot pay it). The 
Commission on Revenue Allocation (CRA) is in charge of administering 
the national equitable share, which determines the division of the national 
revenue of up to 15% per county each year (excluding income generated by 
the counties themselves) on the basis of five criteria: county population, 
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basic services, poverty, land and fiscal responsibility. Note that this fund 
differs from the smaller equalisation fund, which is reserved for the least 
developed counties (CRA 2013) and intends to ensure the distribution of 
basic services at a level similar to that of other counties (Bosire 2017). It 
only represents 0.5% of the national revenue every year.
Fig. 2. Flows of revenues from different sources for county governments.
Source: World Bank (2011, 42).
Health has been the most decentralised sector (Kimathi 2017); other 
sectors, such as agriculture and education, have undergone only partial 
decentralisation (Republic of Kenya 2014). In the field of education, for 
instance, some training centres—such as vocational training centres—are 
now managed by counties. However, school curricula are still developed at 
the national level.30 What is more, some sectors have not been decentralised: 
heritage management, still carried out by the public and research institution 
called the National Museums of Kenya; conservation, handled by the Kenya 
Wildlife Service; security has not been decentralised either. Apart from 
relying on the police, the national army, the NCIC and networks of national 
and international NGOs, the counties have little capacity to maintain peace 
and social cohesion at the local level (Republic of Kenya 2014). Ultimately, 
the absence of decentralisation in some policy areas, such as security, 
reflects a political and legal concern to maintain the central government’s 
base in certain areas. This absence also has a political origin and can be 
explained by fear of the governors’ instrumentalisation of the counties 
police forces.; the fear that governors could have more or less organised 
30. The functions carried out by the national government and which have not 
been decentralised are: international relations, national defence and security, 
labour and employment, social security, education, housing, health, agriculture, 
tourism, the formulation of public policies for the economy, and the currency. 
See Constitution of Kenya (GoK 2010), art. 186, “Respective Functions and Powers 
of National and County Governments.”
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local armies capable of threatening the central government and, to a larger 
extend, the monopoly of violence held by the Kenyan state—according to 
the Weberian principle (Burbidge 2019, 167). However, the limitations to and 
the division of powers that the new constitution provided for have not yet 
been implemented in the local practices of the counties. Mombasa County 
has, for example, established its own county police as well as infrastructure 
(football pitches, street lighting in poor neighbourhoods such as Majengo) 
and activities (dance, drama) to keep young people busy after school. Recent 
studies conducted by political scientist Fathima Badurdeen showcase the 
counterpart of the unique experiment held by Mombasa County. This 
county has a dedicated counter-terrorism department to secure the coast,31 
reduce inequalities and poverty, and alleviate the sense of marginalisation 
among the youth—who are readily recruited by Somali Al-Shabaab gangs 
and terrorists (Badurdeen, 2018). But the county police are poorly trained, 
have insufficient resources and therefore make up an additional layer of 
state repression—and are perceived as such by the youth. The county police 
thus exacerbate violence, conflicts and the recruitment of young people 
from the coast by terrorist and criminal organisations. Similarly, in the 
Kenyan conservation environment, land tenure tensions continue to be a 
source of conflict, fuelled by politicians. This is partly because conservation 
has mostly remained the preserve of White Kenyans. The state violently 
responds to these conflicts, as it did when the Kenya Defence Force was 
deployed to quell the invasion of private ranches in Laikipia County in 
April 2017.32 These two examples highlight a problematic overlap of action 
levels, as well as the strong interdependence between the national and local 
levels when it comes to managing critical issues. Beyond the adoption of a 
new constitution and the legal framework presented above, the overlap is 
most visible in the practical implementation of decentralisation.
3. Decentralisation in Practice: Actors  
and Apparatus of Local Politics
Decentralisation was part of Mwai Kibaki’s political project (2002–2013), 
which focused on growth and the achievement of major development 
projects. From 2013 to 2020, Uhuru Kenyatta implemented a policy 
program in line with the so-called “Big 4” Agenda, a development agenda, 
the primary objective of which was to foster an industrial revolution in 
31. Lamu, Tana River, Kilifi and Kwale counties are among the poorest in the 
country (KNBS & SID 2013).
32. Ogada, Mordecai. 2019. “Decolonising Conservation: It is about the Land, 
Stupid!” The Elephant, 27 June. https://www.theelephant.info/culture/2019/06/27/
decolonising-conservation-it-is-about-the-land-stupid/ [archive].
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Kenya (9.2% of the country’s GDP today against 20% of its GDP in 2022). 
To that extent, national issues are of concern to local elected officials. 
Nevertheless, it is interesting to question their relative independence 
and the nature of their approaches on the local political scene—a scene 
closely linked to that of national politics. The practical application of their 
approaches in relation to citizens—especially the strengthening of public 
participation and the representativeness of ethnic minorities and social 
cadets—are also being debated.
Decentralised Governance,  
a Political Project of a Developmentalist State and its Elites
While inherited from the Kibaki era, the developmentalist discourse of the 
Vision 2030 governmental project is still relevant today. It has accompanied 
decentralisation: each region must join in the national effort and throw 
its weight behind the emergence of an economy that does no longer rely 
solely on its urban middle classes, but also on the wealth of the rural world 
and the economies of counties now presented as the touchstone of national 
construction. As part of the national development agenda, and in the 
context of an economy of public expenditure and debt,33 Uhuru Kenyatta’s 
government (2013–2022) revaluated the Kenyan worker in his public 
speeches and political communications. In doing so, he played a role in 
the interlocking between political and development objectives (Hagmann 
& Reyntjens 2016). To guarantee the peaceful environment needed for 
business, Kenyatta even “shook hands” with Raila Odinga.34 This symbolic 
handshake, which took place in March 2018, was supposed to put an end 
to the political crisis that ensued after the 2017 elections. The Supreme 
Court had overturned election results, leading to a re-run, which took place 
two months later and was boycotted by Raila Odinga (Pommerolle & Josse-
Durand 2017).




34. Despite this handshake, Raila Odinga is still running in opposition to the 
government’s policies and more specifically to William Ruto, the current Vice-
President and candidate for the 2022 election. He claims that some counties 
are not economically viable, advocates for constitutional changes and wants 
the country to be divided in 14 regions to better address the deep inequalities 
between counties. See Kahura, Dauti. 2019. “Building Bridges to Nowhere: Some 





At the county level, this development policy began to take root in 2013 
and is now focused on local development. In regions abandoned by the 
government or plundered by their elected representatives, numerous 
development projects (including hospitals and ambulances, water access 
systems, improvement of the road networks, etc.) have since been 
completed. The policy has also been extended to the county level. Citizens 
gradually seem to show as much—if not more—interest in the development 
projects set up by the counties and their representatives (who organise 
themselves in a more concrete way) as in those promoted by the President 
of the Republic35 (Cheeseman, Lynch & Willis 2016; Waddilove 2019, 347). 
Since the implementation of decentralisation, the counties’ dynamism has 
thus reinforced the competition between the central government and the 
counties, as both sides strive to be central players in Kenya’s political life 
by emphasising their role in the development of their respective levels or 
fields of work (county, constituency, ward). This is particularly true in the 
case of productive regions resulting from colonisation (the former White 
Highlands), now transformed into counties (Laikipia, Trans-nzoia, Nandi, 
Kericho and counties of the former Central Province: Murang'a, Kirinyaga, 
Kiambu, Nyadarua, Nyeri). Today, these counties are working hard to 
develop their factories, cooperatives and export processing zones. This 
governmental approach to local innovation consists in capturing the added 
value of local products by allowing them to be manufactured locally, as in 
the case of coffee or fresh pasteurised milk dispensers for example (Muranga 
County), and by controlling export (the Chemalel Export Processing Zone 
in Nandi County).
This developmentalist ideology, according to which every individual 
and every county must play a role in the national economic effort, is now 
visible at all levels of the state. However, the authoritarian translation of this 
ideology is seen at county level; it is, in fact, reflected in the rationalisation 
of local development by the local and central governments. As the official 
slogan of the decentralised government points out—“48 governments, 1 
Nation”—, the integration of counties into globalisation will also be that of 
the Kenyan nation. Indeed, there is a clear overlap between the political and 
economic programs of the central government and those implemented by 
the counties despite the challenges or power games at play. The proximity 
of local elected officials to political and partisan networks is still relevant 
and continues to play a decisive role in the electoral battle. During the 2017 
elections, governors who had Uhuru Kenyatta’s support had an easier time 
winning the elections (with an average of 53% of the vote) than independent 
candidates who were not aligned with Kenyatta’s Jubilee alliance (with 
35. This is also reflected in the additional 5 million voters registered for the 
2017 elections, while the 2013 elections marked a turning point in voter turnout.
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only 17% of the vote on average). This held true for the governors of Embu, 
Laikipia, Mandera and Meru, who won the elections by large margins 
despite a strong competition for their positions (Gadjanova 2019, 277). 
Note that, it is also a strategy on the part of some, whose credibility and 
legitimacy are reinforced when they criticise the central government: the 
MP of Nandi Constituency, Alfred Keter, was re-elected although he had 
been in clear opposition to Vice-President William Ruto throughout his 
campaign. In any case, local elected officials cannot exist independently of 
the national level, whether in electoral times or during the implementation 
of local development programs and projects—which are strongly influenced 
by the directives and the necessary support of the national political and 
economic elites.
Mode of Action of Local Elected Officials:  
The Members of County Assemblies (MCAs)
The 2013 elections marked the coming into force of both the new Kenyan 
Constitution and decentralisation. On Monday, 4  March, voters went to 
the polls to elect candidates for six different positions. The competition 
had been particularly fierce due to a drastic increase in the number of 
candidates. While elections always require much “trickling-down” of 
national resources to the local level, the 2013 elections—which were 
organised at the ward, constituency and county levels—gave even more 
visibility to the decentralisation process. Indeed, this “trickling-down” to 
the county level took very concrete forms as a result of the multiplication 
of positions at the local level: jobs, vote buying, bribes, local or regional 
projects had been promised by all candidates. In addition, prior to the 
elections, the electoral commission had obtained international funding 
to organise staff training (polling station officials such as the Presiding 
Officer, his deputy and the clerks in particular). Note that most of the staff 
had been recruited locally (most of the clerks were young people from the 
county who had completed their primary schooling or were students). With 
the implementation of decentralisation, the local scene, and particularly 
the arena of local legislative elections, became a central arena for political 
participation within the (wider) Kenyan political scene. The 2013 general 
elections mobilised unprecedented resources. Electoral material had to be 
replaced: in addition to the purchase of electronic kits for biometric voting 
(KIEMS), ballot boxes were given their own colour. Pink represented the 
Women Representative (or Women Rep); and confusingly similar colours 
represented the MPs and MCAs (one’s ballot boxes were beige and the 
other one’s pale yellow). Moreover, before and during the campaign, many 
candidates made numerous requests for funding from the private sector 
or from local politicians who were already holding positions in the local 
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or national governments. Urban centres were also overwhelmed by a wild 
public display of posters printed by candidates. The candidates started 
campaigning with pre-checked, fake ballots bearing their photograph and 
displaying the party symbols (a rooster, an elephant, a key, etc.), in addition 
to displaying the colour associated with the position they were seeking.36 
For its part, the national government deployed numerous corps (military, 
youth, forest rangers and animal park guards37) to ensure the safety of the 
40,883 polling stations (with two guards per station, one at the entrance 
and one inside). In doing so, the government underscored the attention 
paid to this first ballot and the ever-present suspicions of electoral fraud.
With these first general elections, came the hope that following 
representatives of citizens and “bottom” actors—including the “social 
cadets”—would enter politics: young people, women, disabled people, families 
and clans, squatters or migrant workers, civil servants of intermediary 
bodies and institutions. Prior to decentralisation, the electoral format 
rarely—if ever—allow these actors access to political positions. This new 
hope drew its strength from a deep collective belief in elective democracy 
and the strength of legislative institutions—an ambiguous legalism which 
characterises Kenya’s political culture (Katende & Kanyeihamba 1973; 
Warris 2013). However, while the 2013 elections initiated and put into 
practice this new decentralised administrative and political system for 
the first time, there was a clear, strong political continuity in the local 
elections. Thus, many “big men” as well as traditional and influential 
local figures—personalities who were often MPs in their region of origin 
before becoming ministers in the national government38—ran for governor 
positions. Nevertheless, the introduction of a large number of local elected 
officials, the MCAs, raised the question of the political staff’s renewal 
36. These comments are drawn from the observation of the 2013 election 
campaign in Nandi and Trans-Nzoia counties with Dominique Connan, 
complemented by the author’s experience as an international observer during 
the 2017 elections. On the subject of vote materiality in Africa, see the special 
issue of Politique africaine edited by Sandrine Perrot, Marie-Emmanuelle 
Pommerolle and  Justin Willis (2016): https://www.cairn.info/revue-politique-
africaine-2016-4.htm.
37. KDF, KWS, KFS, NYS, police, etc.
38. On the subject of “big men” in Kenya, see the work of Jean-François Médard 
(1992) and François Grignon (1997). Among the most prominent big men were 
Henry Kosgei, who was re-elected six times as MP for the Tinderet constituency 
and held eight ministerial positions between 1979 and 2013, but also Charles 
Njonjo (Attorney General for more than 17 years (1963–1979), MP for the Kikuyu 
constituency and twice minister), who was profiled in an article by Jean-François 
Médard (Médard 1987). The list is long and one could also name Matu Wamae, 
Nicholas Biwot, Kiraitu Murungi, Joseph Ole Nkaissery, etc.
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and that of the potential rapprochement between the state and citizens 
as a result of the implementation of decentralisation. Indeed, while the 
MCAs represented the smallest level of governance, they made up most 
of the candidates at the national level (1450 elected, 700 nominated). 
As of the 2013 elections and the establishment of local Assemblies, this 
position replaced the comparatively pale Ward Councillor position. The 
Constitution assigns the MCAs a dual role: the role of local legislators in 
County Assemblies and the role of territorial administrators, with access 
to the county budget for the citizens of the ward that elected them. This 
gives them a definite influence on the award of scholarships and local 
public contracts. The profiles of these elected officials have been quite 
atypical for Kenyan political scene: not being “professional” politicians, 
MCAs have seemed to be on the fringes of the traditional networks of 
clientelism.39 They were often elected because they had acted on behalf of 
their compatriots—for example, as union representatives, local shopkeepers 
or businessmen, or as young graduates who had returned home to put 
their skills at the service of their rural communities. Their credibility 
was also enhanced by the possibility of impeaching the county governor, 
a procedure which must, however, ultimately be validated by the Senate. 
It seems that their appearance on the political scene encouraged voting 
decisions less influenced by ethnicity considerations than before. Voters 
based their choice on local elected officials’ credibility, respectability and 
progress on development projects. Therefore, local elected officials had to 
convince voters of their deep-seated link with the community as well as 
their ability to act as intermediaries between voters—as is the case for MPs 
at the constituency level—and the state with its traditional elites. These 
logics of moralisation of representatives question the pre-eminence of the 
ethnic affiliations upon which the logics of political representation are 
based in Kenya (Atieno Odhiambo 2004; Berman, Cottrell & Ghai 2009). 
However, generally speaking, voting on the basis of ethnic considerations 
remains very common, particularly in cosmopolitan constituencies—not 
to mention constituencies where political divisions are aligned with sub-
identity divisions (for instance, at the clan level) (NCIC 2014; 2016; Burbidge 
2019, 91–120; Onyango 2018).
During the 2017 elections, changes in political personnel and institutional 
hierarchies took place. They were all the more visible at the county level, 
in particular at the positions of MCAs and the 47 Women Rep’s (one per 
county). Among other things, one notes a form of power redistribution 
to the “social cadets,” since young people and women—sometimes young 
39. Waddilove, Hannah. 2017. “Kenya Voted for Change and Got it… at the Local 




women—were elected; indeed, the 2017 elections saw more women 
entering politics thanks to the creation of a position reserved for women 
(Bouka, Berry & Kamuru 2019). Several young graduate students who 
could not find jobs, Youth Group Leaders, young entrepreneurs, citizens 
from the civil society as well as—more expectedly—individuals from the 
trading class (especially local figures who had their own financial means 
and influence at the local level) were elected as MCAs. Simon Muturi, an 
unemployed 24-year-old candidate who campaigned on a bicycle for the 
Jubilee (that is, the coalition that enabled Kenyatta to be elected in 2013 and 
2017) and was elected for the Muruguru-Gatitu ward, was emblematic of 
this “new generation.” So was Cynthia Muge, a 24-year-old civil engineer 
and the country’s youngest candidate, who was elected as an MCA for 
the Kilibwoni ward. As a young graduated in civil engineering, she 
unsuccessfully tried to get a job in Nandi County administration before 
deciding to run a political campaign, which she primarily envisioned as 
a platform to carry the voice of the youth to the county’s politicians and 
the people in her home ward. Among other things, she proposed and 
introduced a technical and precise plan to renovate the deteriorated road 
infrastructure to the population during her campaign meetings. Note that 
her ward, being almost the size of a constituency (an MP being responsible 
for a constituency), had been divided in a peculiar way. In order to 
overcome the difficulty of meeting her constituents—who would have had 
to travel long distances to reach her office—and to take the diversity of 
their demands into account, she chose to set up a mobile office, moving 
between the different locations where she would meet them on certain 
days of the week.40
However, the role of women in politics remains to be nuanced. Most 
of those who have reached the counties’ highest positions are influential 
women who had already held national positions.41 This holds true in the 
case of the three women candidates who were elected as Kirinyaga’s, 
Bomet’s and Kitui’s first female governors during the 2017 elections.42 
40. Field notes, interview with Cynthia Muge, April 2018, Hotel Eden Spring, 
Kapsabet, Nandi County. See also her detailed interview by the Kenyan media 
Daily Nation: “Cynthia Jepkosgei, 24, Speaks on her Victory as MCA.” 2017. Daily 
Nation, 11 August. https://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/Nandi-MCA-elect-24-
beats-odds/1064-4053920-nnbwikz/index.html [archive].
41. More broadly, many local candidates are elected thanks to their inclusion in 
regional and national patronage networks. On the Kenyan logic of the partial 
renewal of local elites, see Grignon (1999) and Cornell & D’Arcy (2014).
42. Anne Waiguru (former CS for Devolution) for Kirinyaga County, Charity 
Ngilu (former minister and presidential candidate) for Kitui County, and Joyce 
Laboso (former Vice-President of the National Assembly) for Bomet County.
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Laws on gender balance in politics and positive discrimination (according 
to the 2/3 principle) promoted by the Constitution have not yet been 
passed by the Parliament which, like the rest of the Kenyan institutions 
and bodies, function according to a marked patriarchal habitus (Nyabola 
& Pommerolle 2018). Furthermore, the role of the Women Rep remains 
unclear in the Constitution. The mission of these representatives is to 
express the specific needs and demands of Kenyan women and to be the 
“voice of women” in politics. The missions carried out under this new 
position are the subject of considerable debate. This is because they vary 
significantly from one profile to another. Incidentally, this new position 
is sometimes reduced to a springboard to access more positions deemed 
more prestigious and influential, in particular that of MP (ibid., 67–71). 
Finally, the effectiveness of administrative reforms aimed at ensuring the 
counties’ ethnic diversification is called into question by the almost mono-
ethnic composition of the executive, legislative and civil service of the 
counties. It underlines that the majority of power positions still belong to 
the dominant local ethnic group.43 In addition, political competition being 
increased by the number of candidates running, decentralisation seems to 
have reinforced localised violence often spurred by the political class to 
the detriment of citizens, who are its “foot soldiers.”44
Thus, it is difficult to give a clear answer to the question whether 
decentralisation has brought the state and citizens closer. It is clear that this 
new political chessboard allows some elected officials—notably governors 
and senators—to position themselves in relation to national elected officials, 
who take up their political function to strengthen their local legitimacy, 
sometimes by expressing their allegiances to the central power, sometimes 
43. In this regard, see the damning reports of the Auditor General (2019) on 
the ethnic composition of the executive and legislative branches at the county 
level. These reports point out that a large majority of counties do not comply 
with the provisions detailed in section 65 of the County Governments Act of the 
2010 Constitution. The latter provides that 30% of positions must be occupied 
by people who are not coming from the dominant ethnic group in the county. 
However, the latest audit reveals that, on average, only 10% of county staff come 
from minority groups. Figures on the ethnic group of elected officials and civil 
servants in the counties’ administrations are given by the NCIC (2016). See also 
the “Decentralisation in Kenya” section of the article by Nicholas Cheeseman, 
Gabrielle Lynch & Justin Willis (2016), and Dominic Burbidge’s chapter on 
counties described as “ethnic mini-states?” (2019, 92–101). For an analysis of the 
ethnic group of public servants from the 1960s to 2010, see Rebecca Simson (2017).
44. Lynch, Gabrielle. 2014. “Devolution Has Made Politics more Local and 





by criticising the government’s actions in their region (Waddilove 2019; 
Gadjanova 2019). Nonetheless, the emergence of new levels of power and 
objections by the MCAs to the projects or decisions made by the governors 
and MPs—who used to be unquestioned leaders on their lands—indicates a 
kind of rapprochement between these new “local” elected officials and their 
voters. Increased citizen participation, which resulted from decentralisation, 
is supposed to strengthen this proximity between representatives and those 
they represent in the conduct of public affairs.
Citizens’ Modes of Action: The Mixed Experience  
of a Decentralised “Participatory Development”
Public participation is a core element of the constitutional reform. It is up 
to citizens to identify local development issues (Rwigi, forthcoming), and 
this occurs during public forums organised by each county through the 
retrospective plebiscite—by show of hands—of priority development projects. 
This procedure—which follows the model of participatory governance 
created in Porto Alegre (Participatory Budgeting)—aims to tie up strategies 
of local development with the will of the citizens, who must actively 
deliberate budget orientations. The local and decentralised co-production 
of public policies (co-production because it brings together citizens and 
elected officials) is intended to enhance the managerial transparency of the 
counties as well as the political legitimacy of their elected officials (Fung 
& Wright 2001, Wampler & Avritzer 2005). The reality is that these forums 
are either neglected or monopolised by supporters of the dominant party 
or group in local politics; or composed of citizens paid to participate or 
intimidated into self-censorship on the conduct of public affairs. Therefore, 
“participatory” democracy—as a fairer model and a system of good local 
governance—needs be put into perspective; as do the “democratisation” of 
Kenya’s political space and its opening up to civil society.45
Indeed, the participatory approach has not yet proved its worth in 
Kenya—except, perhaps in Makueni County, which is presented as a 
success story. Makueni County’s success is partly due to the career and 
technical expertise of the county governor in office since 2013, Kivutha 
Kibwana. Kibwana is a recognised law professor, human rights advocate 
and former member of the opposition. However, this specific participatory 
process seems to work more to the advantage of his government’s political 
legitimacy than to improve his management. Public participation is “a 
structured way of consulting with persons, groups and entities before 
45. For an updated and transdisciplinary analysis of these debates, see Chauveau 
& Lavigne-Delville (2013). These questions also intersect with the work of French 
sociologist Christian Le Bart (2003) on local citizenship.
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decisions are made” (GoMC 2016). Participants must come from six 
different levels: Village People’s Forum, Cluster People’s Forum, Sub Ward 
People’s Forum, Ward People’s Forum, Sub County People’s Forum and 
the County People’s Forum. In Makueni County, citizens at each of these 
levels nominate eleven people of their choice to form a Development 
Committee (DC). The mission of each DC is to represent the interests of 
the citizens of the level they represent. The DCs of the first four levels 
negotiate and deliberate with each other on the allocation and distribution 
of resources for the development of the ward. At the sub-county or county 
level, the DCs merely reiterate their vested interests in the verification 
and validation of their proposals as they were validated during the public 
participation forums held in the 30 wards of Makueni County. Thus, 
in principle, public participation is supposed to help Makueni County 
achieve two objectives: [1] to include marginalised constituencies in public 
decision-making, and [2] to consolidate the government’s authority over 
its political-administrative territory (GoMC 2016).
To some extent, this system has allowed citizens to influence spending 
in their ward according to their own priorities. There are, however, many 
participation gaps, which highlight the fact that the constituted assemblies 
are not always inclusive or representative. Local figures (e.g. teachers, 
religious leaders, activists, social workers and union representatives), 
particularly men, take up much of the speaking time in these meetings. 
Young people, for instance, often feel excluded from these forums because, 
in the continuity of the baraza tradition, they are usually reserved for 
“elders” and associated with values of respectability, maturity an honour.46 
At the same time, MCAs are demanding that the government grant them 
their own fund (the Ward Development Fund) to carry out their projects 
at the grassroots. So far, they have been denied funding. According to the 
constitution, the ward is not intended to be a financial entity per se, and 
it is the county government that decides on the allocation of funds, based 
on the county’s (that is, not the ward’s) overall priorities. This situation 
creates deep frictions between parliamentarians and the executive. It also 
underscores once more the limits of citizen participation in defining local 
development priorities. The existence of People’s Parliaments—or Bunge 
la Wananchi—also highlights the fact that decentralisation has not really 
made it possible to involve Kenyan citizens in public decision-making 
in satisfactory ways. These People’s Parliaments offer an alternative 
framework for public discussion of political, social and economic affairs; 
and, on the basis principles close to those of “street parliaments” found 
46. Baraza are community forums for public debate, often associated with or 
overseen by councils of elders (Haugerud 1995).
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in several African countries, they have been organised in a national and 
activist network.47
However, the partial renewal of the county elites between 2013 and 2017 
showed that voters had not been fooled and had the means to influence 
the careers of elected officials. To a certain extent, by electing MCAs from 
their communities, citizens used the decision-making mechanisms at their 
disposal to restructure power relations that had hitherto disadvantaged them. 
They did so by mobilising the institutions and machinery of decentralisation 
to bring about the local reconfigurations they needed: namely, access to 
schooling, road construction, obtaining property titles, passing local laws 
to protect local labour or sectors of activities, etc. This has also been 
evidenced by demonstrations, petitions and increased appearances in local 
courts. While they are not new, these local mobilisations are becoming 
more effective and gaining visibility as a result of decentralisation (Lynch 
2011). Employment and working conditions are central issues in the 
national and local political life, where corruption and co-optation are often 
denounced by citizens and activists who feel powerless outside election 
times. These grievances, directed at elected officials and the state, are 
relayed by the new institutions of power (the County Assemblies) and local 
figures (especially Senators) who question the decisions taken by national 
institutions and the state on their territory. To take a concrete example: 
a law to limit the number of machines authorised by multinational tea 
companies for automated tea leaf picking was passed in November 2018 by 
the MCAs of Nandi, a large tea-producing county. This measure allowed 
plantation workers to keep their jobs in spite of the mechanisation of the 
tea sector.48 The governor of Kericho too rallied against the multinational 
Finlay, which intended to dismiss its horticultural workers and close some 
of its tea plantations, on which the county’s economy. Obviously, these 
elected officials were also acting to protect their own interests and secure 
their individual re-election (MCAs among others). They did not hesitate to 
go against interests of the people, when necessary to ensure the continued 
support of agri-food lobbies and private sector individuals who finance 
and support the political campaigns and local actions of governors and 
their ministers.49 One final note. The so-called “Councils of Elders”—the 
47. See the special issue on “Public Spaces of Speech and Practices of Citizenship 
in Africa,” of Politique africaine, edited by Richard Banégas, Florence Brisset-
Foucault and Armando Cutolo (2012), or Rasmussen & Omanga (2012/3).
48. Two workers can carry this machine, where manual harvesting requires an 
average of 30 workers per plot.
49. Donors can indeed contribute to the counties’ finances but their contribution 
must be declared in the budget, which is certainly not always the case (bribes, 
illicit financing, money laundering).
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traditional authorities in Kenya—still play a major role in guiding local 
policy,50 especially at the village level, where they are often appointed as 
administrators (see diagram).
4. Decentralisation in Question:  
Political Ethnicity, Corruption and Inequality
While decentralisation has raised high hopes, it has also caused wariness, 
especially of the “ethnicisation” of local governments, the potential impact 
of decentralisation on corrupt practices and the persistence of regional 
inequalities—now measured at the county level.
Towards Increased Ethnicisation of Politics
Between 2007 and 2008, fear of ethnicisation was the strongest in counties 
regarded as hotspots of violence. Such counties are often the scene of 
protracted conflicts over the control and monopolisation of resources. For 
example, in counties of the former North-Eastern Province like Turkana 
and Marsabit, lack of access to water for Turkana and Samburu pastoralist 
groups remains a driving force behind violent and armed conflicts (Scott-
Villiers 2017). In cosmopolitan counties such as Nakuru—one of the 
counties that hosts many IDPs in the Rift Valley—, tensions over access to 
and ownership of land are a source of political tensions (Boone 2013). This 
is also the case in counties where a majority of the population belongs to 
a single ethnic group. For instance, in Uasin Gishu, the Kikuyu occupation 
of land and ownership of trade has long been contested by Kalenjin elites, 
who mobilise indigenousness to maintain their political and economic base 
in the region (Elfversson & Sjögren 2019, 8).
The counties’ response to these fears, tensions and conflicts has been 
ambiguous as the initiatives of elected officials and administrators have 
been driven by their own interests. In the case of Nandi County, a market 
has been established on the western border—which Nandi County shares 
with Kakamega County. Land disputes and tensions over use of the forest 
by the two main communities of the region, the Nandi and Luhya, have 
long been a source of friction in the border are between Nandi County and 
Kakamega County. In November 2014, violent clashes erupted in the area 
after the arrest of three Luhya men suspected of killing a Nandi because 
of a land dispute. A meeting between Nandi County’s governor, Cleophas 
Lagat (2013–2017), and the governor of Kakamega, Wycliffe Oparanya 
(2012–2022), ensued. The two men proposed to set up a “peace market” in 
Kamungei; an initiative supported and approved by the president of the 
50. On the role of Councils of Elders in the conduct of local political and public 
affairs in Kenya, see Josse-Durand (2020) and Nyamweru & Chidongo (2018).
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NCIC, Francis Ole Kaparo.51 With the agreement of the governors of the 
two counties, the NCIC decided to reinforce police patrols in the area and to 
allocate additional vehicles to the two counties on a temporary basis in case 
of conflicts. In addition, the idea of deploying the army in temporary camps 
along the border emerged. From 2017 onwards, on the southern border of 
Nandi County, Cleophas Lagat’s successor—the young governor Stephen 
Arap Sang (2017–2022)— campaigned for the integration of eight lowland 
localities with Nandi names, but which belong to Kisumu County.52 The idea 
was to set up an Export Processing Zone, which cannot be built in Nandi 
County because of the pressure that intensive tea production already exerts 
on the arable land of the Nandi escarpment, there. A local industrial park 
specialised in tea manufacturing would mainly benefit Nandi County; this 
fact is a source of tension between not only the Luo and Nandi farmers of 
the area but also the Nandi inhabitants and migrant tea plantation workers—
who are often of Luo, Luhya and Kisii origins. What can thus be said is that 
the role of the counties in conflict management has been restricted to local 
and small-scaled actions, which are sometimes limited to the mandate of 
a particular governor. Moreover, their choices and the modalities of their 
actions have underlined a lack of coordination with the central government 
and a lack of coherence in the actions carried out—in particular with the 
NCIC—depending on the type of issues that the conflicts give rise to.
Towards Acute Corruption at the Local Level?
Decentralisation and major development projects driven by Vision 2030 
have led to the decentralisation of corruption (Burbidge 2015, D’Arcy & 
Cornell 2016). Scandals are no longer just national or international, as 
was the case with Goldenberg or Anglo-leasing, but mainly involve the 
corruption of local public funds.53
51. Wekesa, Grace. 2015. “NCIC Chair Francis Kaparo Warns Nandi, 
Luhya Leaders against Incitement.” The Standard, 25  January. https://www.
standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000149182/ncic-chair-francis-kaparo-warns-
nandi-luhya-leaders-against-incitement [archive]; Sirma, Evans. S.d. “Governor 
Lagat Commissions Amani Market to Foster Unity in Kamung’ei Border.” County 
Government of Nandi. https://nandicounty.go.ke/governor-lagat-commissions-
amani-market-to-foster-unity-in-kamungei-border/ [archive].
52. Jelima, Rael. 2018. “Nandi County Claims Seven Towns along Border 
with Kisumu.” The Standard, 28 May. https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/
article/2001281967/nandi-county-out-to-reclaim-seven-towns-from-kisumu 
[archive].
53. This corruption also concerns the CDF, managed by the MPs, as it was 
already the case before the implementation of devolution. The Auditor General’s 
report on public finances for the year 2013/2014 reckons that corruption affects 
270 constituencies (out of a total of 290) and is estimated at 38.5 million EUR. 
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Yet, what is sometimes associated with simple corruption actually reveals 
tensions between county and national governments over the allocation 
of funds. The “wheelbarrow scandal” provides a perfect example of this 
phenomenon. The scandal burst forth in 2015 when the Bungoma County 
Ministry of Agriculture bought ten wheelbarrows at a price of 109,000 KES 
each (about 965 EUR) while the market price was around 5,000 KES (about 
45 EUR).54 Shortly after that, seven county officials were fined 300,000 KES, 
the non-payment of which was punishable by imprisonment of 18 months.55 
Price inflation in county budgets and the justification of expenses are also 
crucial issues because unspent funds are returned to the County Revenue 
Fund at the end of the fiscal year—which is set for 30 June—after the Budget 
Controller’s audit. Such funds are then put back into play for the following 
year.56 Incidentally, while—by voting for supplementary budgets—local 
assemblies have enabled local governments to move money previously 
allocated to a budget line, project or ministry within a county, to do so 
is often difficult. Note that local assemblies may also occasionally clash 
with the executive when they wish to “settle score” with certain county 
officials or expose local corruption. One such tussle ensued the Assembly’s 
refusal to transfer funds four days before the deadline for the 2019 fiscal 
year in Laikipia County. Because of this—and because of limited funding—
the wages of county employees were frozen for three months in a row.57 
These practices, which are sometimes too quickly labelled as corrupt, 
highlight the challenge of spending locally and on the basis of the county’s 
development properties and non-fungible budgets. They also underline the 
issue of the politicisation of budget management.
One finding bears note. Corruption has not so much been decentralised—
or in the words of the Kenyans, “corruption has [not so much] been 
“NEW: Billions Unaccounted For in CDF Audit.” 2016. RoggKenya, 5 December. 
https://roggkenya.org/new-billions-unaccounted-for-in-cdf-audit/ [archive].
54. Oteba, Titus. 2015. “Uproar as Bungoma County Buys 10 Wheelbarrows 
at Sh1m.” The Standard, 8 September. https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/
article/2000175604/uproar-as-bungoma-county-buys-10-wheelbarrows-at-sh1m 
[archive].
55. Amadala, Benson. 2018. “Seven Former Officials Sent to Jail over 
Wheelbarrow Scandal.” Daily Nation, 25 June. https://www.nation.co.ke/counties/
bungoma/7-sentenced-in-wheelbarrow-case/1183258-4630664-10cux86z/index.
html [archive].
56. Shiundu, Alphonse. 2013. “Six Counties Fail to Spend Allocated Funds.” The 
Standard, 14  August. https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000090917/six-
counties-fail-to-spend-allocated-funds [archive].
57. Munyi, Martin. 2019. “Laikipia Assembly Rejects Supplementary Budget.” 




devolved”— as multiplied; meaning that it has multiplied due to the increase 
in the number of contexts that are conducive to corrupt practices. Since 
2015, successive reports of the Auditor General have revealed that at least 
20 counties out of 47 experience irregularities in the management of their 
public finances. In fact, many county governors are involved in serious 
corruption cases: following the disappearance of about 17  million  EUR 
(2 billion KES), Governor Obado and several officials from Migori County 
have been monitored by the Ethics and Anti-corruption Authority (EACC) 
for “abuse of office and corruption.”58 For his part, the controversial Nairobi 
County Governor, Mike Sonko—who was, until recently, thought to be 
very close to President Kenyatta [who made the fight against corruption 
the touchstone of his second term]—was arrested in December 2019 as he 
was trying to flee to Tanzania. He [and his immediate political circle] is 
being proceeded against for the embezzlement of public funds amounting 
to 3.2  million  EUR.59 In 2012, an opinion poll conducted by AfriCOG 
highlighted that a third of the surveyed Kenyans who were against 
decentralisation justified their opinion by saying that the new system would 
lead to a “decentralisation of corruption.”60 Decentralisation was, at least in 
theory, supposed to provide checks and balances mechanisms by affording 
better representation in national and local governments and institutions to 
minority groups, social cadets and opposition parties. In practice, however, 
it has also opened new windows of opportunity for corrupt practices, among 
other things, through the levying of local taxes and the allocation of local 
budgets and public contracts.61 At the same time, these practices—which are 
simultaneously rooted in local clientelist networks and connected to the 
national scene—are those of elected officials who are increasingly “close” 
to citizens. Thanks to their proximity to citizens, these officials are in a 
58. Mbula, Ruth. 2019. “Migori County Official on Graft Charge Detained for 
Four Days.” Daily Nation, 9 May. https://www.nation.co.ke/counties/migori/
Court-detains-Migori-official-four-days/1183306-5097492-xcc1yrz/index.html 
[archive].
59. “Nairobi Governor Mike Sonko Denies Corruption Charges in Court.” 
2019. Al-Jazeera, 9 December. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/12/nairobi-
governor-mike-sonko-pleads-innocent-corruption-charges-191209134806019.
html [archive].
60. Two years later, a second survey showed that 33% of Kenyans believed that 
“all or most” of the county governors were “involved in corruption,” with the 
figure rising to 37% for members of the county assemblies (MCAs). In 2016, the 
perception of corruption at the county level was even higher: 78% of Kenyans 
believed that the county government office “uses corruption, sometimes or 
systematically.” 
61. I warmly thank Alexia Van Riij for shedding light on my understanding of 
corrupt practices in Kenya.
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position to both challenge and denounce corruption; or, conversely, have a 
front-row seat to benefit from corruption—including in electoral times, in 
which bribes are commonplace.
Recentralisation as a Response to the Strong Persistence  
of Inequalities between Counties?
Governors have also complained about inequalities between counties; 
inequalities related to differing state-issued budget allowances, varying 
abilities to raise taxes, and the presence (or, for that matter, absence) of 
county-managed resources. The inequitable redistribution of resources 
between counties is at the heart of political debates and alliances. For 
example, while it is very sparsely populated—albeit very poor, much 
revenue is allocated to Turkana County.62 These allowances should be 
based on the counties’ own available resources to raise funds and taxes 
(for example, Narok County benefits from important revenues from local 
tourism thanks to the presence of Masai Mara National Park, a major 
luxury safari destination in the East-African region). As noted above, each 
county receives 15% of the national revenue annually, and some counties 
benefit from the equalisation fund that amounts to 0.5% of the annual 
national income, and is earmarked for the country’s poorest counties. This 
additional but minimal funding is not enough to “brush up” these counties, 
which are lagging far behind in terms of access to the most basic services. 
Furthermore, due to the legal and constitutional framework, which severely 
limits the counties’ ability to obtain cash flows, the levying of local taxes 
leads to circumventions in counties whose economic stability depends on 
an unstable source of revenue (natural and cultural heritage sites, national 
parks) or sector of activity (tourism, agriculture, etc.). It also generates 
localised corruptive practices which limit the generation of revenue such as 
untimely taxes on public transport (matatu) between counties, levied at the 
entrance to cities.63 These inequalities have persisted since colonial times, 
and have been reinforced since then. The ghost of the former provincial 
administration and its functioning still hovers over the counties, whose 
borders are not so new, as they sometimes overlap with those of the old 
districts. This underlines the central state’s maintained control over its 
peripheries, which explains the difficult and partial implementation of 
62. On inequalities between counties, see the report of the Kenya National 
Bureau of Statistics and the Society for International Development (2013). On 
the political aspects of territorial inequalities in Kenya, also see Owiti (2014).
63. Owiti, Maugo. 2015. “Matatu operators decline proposal to remit tax through 





decentralisation. In the counties, structural spending reduction is also 
among the main challenges of decentralisation: huge amounts of resources 
are channelled into recurrent expenditure. And some counties spend up 
to 80% of their budget on wages. This is, in part, due to the fact that they 
inherited staff from the provincial administration (CRA 2013; Franceschi, 
Memusi & Muhindi 2015).
Finally, a trend towards recentralisation—through the creation of 
regional economic blocs—highlights the limitations of the possibilities 
that decentralisation offers county governments to raise sufficient equity 
capital to carry out their five-year plans. A law aimed at clarifying the 
administrative and financial organisation of regional blocs and the potential 
public/private partnerships set up by counties is also under consideration. 
This was initiated by the Council of Governors (CoG), which is composed 
of the county governors who meet to promote good governance and local 
development.64 In September  2019, the governors voted in favour of the 
so-called the Ugatuzi Initiative, a constitutional reform to strengthen 
decentralisation. This reform provides for, among other things, the 
establishment of a three-tier system of government (national, county 
and regional) and the creation of regional governments to strengthen the 
devolution of responsibilities. Over the past five years, under the leadership 
of CoG’s President Wycliffe Oparanya, governor of Kakamega County 
and leader of the largest regional bloc (the Lake Region Economic Bloc, 
which includes 14 multiparty counties), the following regional blocs have 
flourished and strengthened their capacities: the North Rift Economic 
Bloc (7 counties), the Frontier Counties Development Council (7), the 
Lake Region Economic Bloc (14), the Central Kenya Economic Bloc (10), 
the South Eastern Kenya Economic Bloc (3) and the Jumuiya ya Kaunti za 
Pwani (6).65 These six blocs group the counties into large economic regions 
independently of the partisan affiliations of the governors. The Lake 
Region Economic Bloc is one of the first to have formalised this economic 
pact between counties. It brings together 14 counties in an unprecedented 
combination, uniting the counties bordering Lake Victoria (which was 
won over by the opposition) and those of the Highlands (won over by the 
coalition in power since the alliance between Kenyatta and Ruto in 2013). 
The Lake Region Economic Bloc Investment Bank was created to serve as 
a joint; and, in it, each of the counties deposited an equivalent amount of 
money: 200 million KES per county, for a total amount of 2.8 billion KES 
(about 25 million EUR). The objective of these blocs is to strengthen the 
64. “Ugatuzi Initiative.” 2019. The Council of Governors. https://www.cog.go.ke/
component/k2/item/179-ugatuzi-initiative [archive].
65. See the map of the blocs made by the CoG (s.d.): https://cog.go.ke/regional-
economic-blocs [archive].
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counties’ comparative advantages, optimise their economies of scale and 
attract regional investments—following the model of the European Union 
and the East African Community and with the support of the central 
government. In the case of the Lake Region Economic Bloc, the objective 
is to revive the tea, sugar, dairy and fishing sectors by: [1] providing start-
up capital for local entrepreneurs that are supported by their county; and 
[2] building regional industrial parks to create jobs in these sectors and 
increase the local added value.
While the policy of regional economic blocs is still topical, it lacks a 
legal framework; the central authorities and institutions have been slow to 
legislate on this issue. Thus, the governors’ Ugatuzi Initiative was quickly 
abandoned and incorporated into the Building Bridges Initiative (BBI), a 
new national initiative for a general reform of the Constitution through 
a series of amendments. The BBI was launched in March 2018, following 
the symbolic handshake between Kenyatta and Odinga. A team of 14 well-
known figures appointed by the two leaders have since formed the task 
force at the heart of the BBI. These 14 figures—who, like the president of 
the commission Yusuf Haji (senator and former minister), are from the 
activist, political and religious spheres—are in charge of drawing up a 
program of reforms aimed at restoring the pact of confidence between the 
rulers and the ruled, and facilitating the concrete implementation of the 
2010 Constitution. The taskforce issued its report on 27 November 2019, 
with one month’s delay. The highest state dignitaries—President, Vice-
President, speakers from both assemblies—and the main political leaders 
were present for the report’s release. While this text is not legally binding, 
it puts forward major institutional reforms. As far as decentralisation is 
concerned, the proposals for improvements are many. Examples include 
the strongly recommended grouping of counties into “regional units.” 
According to the report, the share of the national income allocated to the 
counties should be increased from the current 15% per year to a minimum 
of 35% per year, and should be distributed more equitably between counties 
by taking into account the actual population density (up to a maximum of 
50%); branches of the Auditor General’s offices should be set up at the local 
level for greater control of public expenditures and accounts; the ward level 
should have greater decision-making power in access to public services; 
etc. The year that has elapsed since the task force began its national tour, 
mobilising nearly 8,000 citizens and elected officials, has been marked by 
criticism, hopes and rumours.66 From a political point of view, the BBI is, 
66. Their activities and the preparation of the report were widely covered by 
the media, fuelling numerous rumours and spreading false reports. Only one 
member of the committee is a lawyer, and some measures remain vague, such 
as the range of 35%-50% of the budget allocated to the counties or the possibility 
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above all, the expression of a rapprochement between the president and 
his main opponent Raila Odinga, also aimed at William Ruto and his 
presidential ambitions for 2022 keeping at bay.67 As a matter of fact, the 
main reform proposals (namely, to transition to a semi-presidential regime; 
strengthen anti-corruption measures, parity and inclusion in institutions; 
rationalise wages and the decentralised system; and introduce a Prime 
Minister position chosen by the President from among the parliamentary 
majority) are clearly reminiscent of the opposition’s demands and programs 
at the time of the 2005 referendum.
Conclusion: Decentralisation in Kenya,  
“Everyone’s Turn to Eat”? 68
The Kenyan decentralisation experience raises the inevitable question 
of the consequences of the disruption of the political hierarchy on local 
development, corruption and political competition. In Kenya’s political 
history, local development income has often benefited only large landowners, 
state-owned companies—often led by powerful elected officials or the 
president’s entourage—and multinational corporations such as Unilever in 
the tea sector, owner of the Lipton brand, or Monsanto in the grain sector—
and often protected by the state (Holmquist, Weaver & Ford 1994, 76). 
Decentralisation has resulted in the creation of funding as well as human 
and institutional means of encouraging local and regional development. Yet 
development gains are under imminent threat of monopolisation. The taking 
of public action at the local level, by the ministries and county assemblies, 
is in fact ambiguous since it can be put sometimes at the service of citizens 
and sometimes at the service of the interests of elected officials and local 
authority representatives. Elected officials in the new local governments—
from the MCA to the governor and his cabinet appointees—all have 
taken a keen interest in the economic benefits brought and multiplied by 
decentralisation. Evidence shows that there are strong tensions between 
that the newly reintroduced figure of the Prime Minister could be the leader of 
the opposition at the same time.
67. William Ruto, who aims to become President in 2022, indeed suffered 
from the rapprochement between the President and his former opponent Raila 
Odinga, which left him in the shadows. Present at the ceremony alongside the 
latter two, he gave his official support to the report but would suffer from a 
referendum campaign of which he would only be the third man. 
68. According to the expression often used in reference to the “politics of the 
belly” (Bayart 1989) and taken up in relation to Kenya by Michela Wrong (2010), 
Daniel Branch, Nicholas Cheeseman & Gardner (2010), and more recently by 
Michelle D’Arcy & Agnes Cornell (2016) to refer to the corrupt practices of the 
new decentralised system.
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members of the local governments over access to and management of the 
various local budgets, not to mention the repeated scandals that illustrate 
the misuse of these funds—for example, when they are squandered on 
unjustified per diem and personal investments. At the same time, some 
tenuous overlaps create a strong interdependence between elected officials 
and the existence of a system of territorial administration deployed in 
the counties by the central government. These overlaps underline the 
persistence of the national level administrations, bodies and representatives 
in the conduct of local development and in the access of candidates to the 
positions they covet. In this respect, it seems that the establishment of a 
new political order, raising of national consciousness and building of unity 
that should have followed the collective catharsis announced in the early 
2000s have not worked properly. The new decentralised structure is, as a 
matter of fact, still precarious in its practices, which attest to the presence of 
the central state and the lingering vicissitudes of the provincial era and the 
country’s political history. The latent lack of confidence in the institutions 
of power and government committees, as well as the persistent distrust 
of the procedure of popular participation in public hearings, confirm this 
hypothesis (Lynch 2018).
However, it must be noted that—while they are tainted by corruption—
fundings earmarked for the counties (i.e. equalisation funds and equitable 
share funds) and the development projects that have been implemented 
reflect the progress made since 2013. Decentralisation—which enjoys 
unwavering public and voter support—strengthens state power and, 
to some extent, state legitimacy. It also fuels clientelist networks, at the 
head of which newly elected officials take advantage of the possibilities 
that corruption has multiplied, at all levels. These officials blithely enjoy 
symbolic (career, legitimacy) and concrete (bribes, embezzlement) benefits 
from the redistribution and trickling down of national resources to the local 
level. And while some local elected officials and county servants act as 
counterweights in the distribution of public funds among constituencies, 
others become decentralised actors in a national accumulation strategy, the 
possibilities of which decentralisation has multiplied. The local scene is 
emerging as the new network of regional patronage, which is maintained by 
corrupt political practices and fuelled by the intimidation and/or purchase 
of a local electorate. To that extent, the emergence of elected officials at the 
county level has not resulted in a thorough renovation or transformation 
of the political culture of post-colonial elites (Haugerud 1995). The question 
then becomes whether decentralisation functions as a tool for the elites to 
engage in nepotistic behaviour; and we must determine to what extent local 
mandates are part of the debate on the colonial legacy and the formation of 
the post-colonial state in Kenya (Bourmaud 1988).
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The unprecedented experience of Kenyan decentralisation provides 
concrete answers, but also leaves open questions about the effects of 
decentralised governance on the transformations—and the continuities—
of the country’s political culture. Future research will provide a better 
understanding of the consequences of decentralisation, as well as a 
rethinking of the political registers shaped by development issues. This 
will allow us to deepen and nuance the classical theories of politics in 
Africa, which are articulated around the notions of clientelism, nepotism 
and neo-patrimonialism. As the many examples and dynamics detailed in 
this chapter highlighted, decentralisation unites the 47 governments which 
make up a single nation in a complex motion. But towards which horizon? 
Both county governments and the central government have, on more than 
one occasion, claimed that “decentralisation works” or “is working.” As a 
matter of fact, the official slogan of the Annual Decentralization Conference, 
where county and national officials meet, reads as follows: “Devolution 
is working!” Optimist slogans aside, however, we are confronted with the 
following question: what could the initiatives for constitutional amendments 
and institutional reforms bode for Kenya’s future? The BBI initiative is 
ongoing, but it already suggests that, once again, popular participation 
in constitutional amendments and in shaping public and political life is 
partial, and will certainly, as in the past, lack concrete implementation. 
The restructuring of the political camps is happening in the run-up to the 
2022 presidential election, in which Uhuru Kenyatta is not eligible. Many 
governors—such as Gideon Moi, son of Daniel arap Moi and governor of 
Baringo, or Ali Hassan Joho, governor of Mombasa—as well as national-
level and government politicians, headed by the current Vice-President 
William Ruto, will lead a campaign that will certainly be colourful. During 
this campaign, the issues surrounding the reform of the constitution and the 
effective implementation of decentralisation—as well as the preservation of 
the interests of the economic and political elites and of some counties that 
influential elected officials playing in the foreground on the national stage 
represent—will be key elements of political competition at all levels.
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